CC owasp-security-code-review
(no description)
Most AI code reviews flag generic "best practices" without catching real vulnerabilities.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, consistency, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keySKILL.md:154Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)- Private keys: `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlyquoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- penetration test
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:47Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Requests a penetration test or red team review
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:132Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Check: no alerting on suspicious activity (brute force, privilege escalation)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:263Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Does not run dynamic analysis or penetration testing
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "trigger_keywords" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "pricing"
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (owasp-security-code-review) differs from the folder (owasp-security-review)
- 50When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 82 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2123 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 22 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 82 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 37.