SKILLEMALL.ai

BB homebutler

Homelab server operations via homebutler CLI/MCP. Check system status, generate butler reports, scan inventory/topology, manage Docker containers, install self-hosted apps, verify backup drills, Wake-on-LAN, port scanning, alerts, backup/restore, and multi-server SSH.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: SangheeSon v2.3.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 915 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationDockerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
76/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:34
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    cd homebutler && make build && sudo mv homebutler /usr/local/bin/

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2915 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 268: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Homebutler is a coherent homelab management guide, but it gives agents powerful server and data-changing commands without clear pre-action safeguards for destructive operations.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026