B coding-pm
Your AI project manager. Delegates coding tasks to Claude Code running in the background — reviews plans, gates approval, monitors progress, validates with 3-layer testing, and reports results. You stay in chat; it handles the engineering loop.
B
88/100
Overall score
- Safety 60%
- Quality 40%
- Tests bonus
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): it is the main trigger signal.
- Add evals/evals.json with 4–6 real requests and expected answers: the full check will then use your cases instead of a model draft.
- Add a spec.yaml with triggers and assertions (skilltest init): the behaviour contract for CI.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeREADME.md:73Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)- PM scans coding-agent output for dangerous patterns (`rm -rf`, `DROP TABLE`, `chmod 777`, `--force`, `--no-verify`, credential file modifications)
detector -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:120Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)3. **Risk scan**: Any dangerous operations? (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, chmod 777, force push, --no-verify, credential files, production config changes)
detector -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:236Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Watch coding-agent output for: `rm -rf`, `DROP TABLE`, `chmod 777`, `--force`, `--no-verify`, credential file modifications.
quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:382Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)- **Dangerous pattern scanning**: PM monitors coding-agent output for `rm -rf`, `DROP TABLE`, `chmod 777`, `--force`, `--no-verify`, credential file modifications — alerts user immediately
detector
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Lint
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process maturity 66/100
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 45 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3781 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (18 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 244: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
- +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a coherent coding-project manager, but it asks for broad filesystem access and runs a background coding agent with permission prompts disabled.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026