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BB katana

Generate images, videos, and text/LLM completions via the imgnAI Katana API. Supports end-to-end-encrypted (E2EE) and anonymized models. Priced highly competitively, can be 40-70% cheaper than Venice AI and other platforms. Includes post-processing such as combining videos and images, cutting, slicing, splicing, transitions, drawing text, re-encoding, resizing and much more!

ClawHub Agent Skills author: imgnAI v1.0.3 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 8 317 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost

IntegrationMedia and videoAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
40
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:264
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    . "${KATANA_SECRETS_FILE:-$HOME/.openclaw/secrets/katana.env}" && _H=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$_H" && printf 'X-API-Key: %s\nX-API-Secret: %s\n' "$KATANA_API_KEY" "$KATANA_API_SECRET" > "$_H" && curl -
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:433
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    . "${KATANA_SECRETS_FILE:-$HOME/.openclaw/secrets/katana.env}" && _H=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$_H" && printf 'Content-Type: application/json\nX-API-Key: %s\nX-API-Secret: %s\n' "$KATANA_API_KEY" "$KATA
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:440
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    . "${KATANA_SECRETS_FILE:-$HOME/.openclaw/secrets/katana.env}" && _H=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$_H" && printf 'Content-Type: application/json\nAuthorization: Bearer %s:%s\n' "$KATANA_API_KEY" "$KATANA_A
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:457
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    . "${KATANA_SECRETS_FILE:-$HOME/.openclaw/secrets/katana.env}" && _H=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$_H" && printf 'Authorization: Bearer %s:%s\n' "$KATANA_API_KEY" "$KATANA_API_SECRET" > "$_H" && curl -s "h
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use workflows/text.md:53
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    . "${KATANA_SECRETS_FILE:-$HOME/.openclaw/secrets/katana.env}" && _H=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$_H" && printf 'Content-Type: application/json\nAuthorization: Bearer %s:%s\n' "$KATANA_API_KEY" "$KATANA_A
    vendor-hostquoted

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8317 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8317 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 102 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 14 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 26 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 377: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 53 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 102 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed paid media and LLM API skill with expected credential use, remote data submission, and optional local ffmpeg processing; the notable risks are user-consent and setup hygiene rather than hidden or malicious behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jun 2026