SKILLEMALL.ai

DD coding-tutor

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: openclaw v0.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 063 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 19 h ago

LS0tCm5hbWU6IGNvZGluZy10dXRvcgpkZXNjcmlwdGlvbjog57yW56iL5a2m5Lmg5Yqp5omL77yM5Z+65LqOIGZyZWVDb2RlQ2FtcCDor77nqIvkvZPns7vorr7orqHjgILnlKjkuo7vvJooMSkg5bim5a2m57y…

As a process D 36/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ReferenceSoftware developmentLearningtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
56/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
36/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:1
    Long base64-looking blob
    LS0t…M5Z+65Lq…L6K+t6Ki…mlw
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:1
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    LS0t…M5Z+65Lq…L6K+t6Ki…mlw

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 36/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1063 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 0 headings, hard to scan
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a low-impact coding tutor skill; its file is unusually base64-encoded, but decoding shows only programming lesson content and examples.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026