SKILLEMALL.ai

BF transcribe

Transcribe audio files to text using local Whisper (Docker). Use when receiving voice messages, audio files (.mp3, .m4a, .ogg, .wav, .webm), or when asked to transcribe audio content.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: javicasper v1.0.2 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 268 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/transcribe

ReferenceDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
35/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/transcribe
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install.sh:67
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/transcribe" /usr/local/bin/transcribe
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install.sh:68
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/transcribe

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/transcribe

Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/transcribe
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/transcribe
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 268 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 183: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This transcription skill appears purpose-aligned, but its installer uses privileged global installation, mutable remote dependencies, and references a missing CLI wrapper, so it needs review before use.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026