SKILLEMALL.ai

CC reflex-arc

Zero-cost cognitive immune system for AI agents. Fires automatic pre-response reflexes that catch contradictions, scope drift, hallucinations, overengineering, and tone mismatches BEFORE output reaches the user. Makes every other skill better by upgrading the bot's core reasoning quality. No APIs, no services, no cost — pure meta-cognition.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: John DeVere Cooley v1.0.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 081 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:42
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Before delivering any qualifying response, silently run these six checks in

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
  • 100Steps. 53 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2081 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 342: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a transparent self-checking skill for agent replies, with no evidence of hidden data access, persistence, network use, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026