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BB apex

Trade and monitor ApeX perpetual futures. Check balances, view positions with P&L, place/cancel orders, execute market trades, or submit trade reward enrollments. Use when the user asks about ApeX trading, portfolio status, crypto positions, activity enrollments, or wants to execute trades on ApeX.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: joshlin111 v1.0.3 11 files body ≈ 1 345 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: consistency, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructureFinancetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: apex (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:53
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      **Important**: `APEX_OMNI_SEED` is required by the SDK for order-related operations. Treat it like a private key/seed phrase and keep it strictly local. Do not share it, do not commit it, and prefer t
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:26
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      **Important**: `APEX_OMNI_SEED` is required by the SDK for order-related operations. Treat it like a private key/seed phrase and keep it strictly local. Do not share it or commit it.
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:58
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:87
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…SI6+mHlY…ppA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:247
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Mvs+9YWe…kJX/w/bGA1…GvA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:291
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…10J+2uqs…id2/7W5r…us6/hSDieIU/6gaK…AOA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:430
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw=="
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:463
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (apex) differs from the folder (apex-trading)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 52 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1345 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -34 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 299: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 52 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This ApeX skill is mostly transparent about being a trading tool, but it can place or cancel live futures orders with high-impact credentials and too few enforced safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026