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CC uniclaw

Trade on UniClaw prediction markets. Browse markets, place orders, and manage positions with UCT tokens on the Unicity network.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jvsteiner v0.2.1 16 files body ≈ 1 044 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url scripts/deposit.ts:53
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (code comment)
    // Send tokens directly to the server
    comment
Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:45
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:62
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:130
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:164
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:453
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
    detector

Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
  • 85Steps. 16 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1044 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -31 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 127: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Review recommended because this prediction-market skill can move UCT tokens and use wallet secrets, but its safeguards and disclosures are not strong enough for that authority.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026