SKILLEMALL.ai

BC openmerch-contact-discovery

Find a professional's work email from their name and company domain. Powered by OpenMerch. Not email verification.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kernel Studio v1.0.2 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 1 113 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 15 h ago

Find a professional's work email from their name and company domain.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key find-email.mjs:36
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "title"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 9 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1113 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 114: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This appears to be a purpose-aligned email-discovery skill, with the main caveat that users should understand personal data is sent to an external provider.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: · 8 Jun 2026