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BC mjolnir-shadow

Mjolnir Shadow (雷神之影) — Automated rotating backup system for OpenClaw workspaces. Creates GPG-encrypted, rotating backups of workspace files, configs, and data to WebDAV storage. Requires bash, curl, Python 3, gpg (gnupg). Optional env var MJOLNIR_SHADOW_PASS for non-interactive GPG decryption. Triggers on backup, data safety, disaster recovery, workspace protection, system backup, 备份, 数据安全, 灾备, 雷神之影.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: king6381 v2.0.0 MIT-0 8 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 944 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

GeneratorInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security README.md:188
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)
    Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:188
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/restore-kit.sh:245
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    if curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x 2>/dev/null | $SUDO bash - 2>/dev/null; then
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/restore-kit.sh:265
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "       ${DIM}curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo bash -${NC}"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/restore-kit.sh:265
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "       ${DIM}curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo bash -${NC}"
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/restore-kit.sh:596
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "     1. 安装 Node.js:  ${CYAN}curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo bash - && sudo apt install -y nodejs${NC}"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/restore-kit.sh:596
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "     1. 安装 Node.js:  ${CYAN}curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo bash - && sudo apt install -y nodejs${NC}"
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 944 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 404: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real OpenClaw backup and recovery skill, but its automatic recovery paths can overwrite live data, install system software, restore executable skills, and restart OpenClaw with limited safety checks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026