DC securityreview
(no description)
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keySKILL.md:32Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)* Flag any variables or strings that match common patterns for API keys (`API_KEY`, `_SECRET`), passwords, private keys (`-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:37Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)const apiKey = "sk_l…ghi";
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:37Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)const apiKey = "sk_l…ghi";
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low Secrets in code
secret-aws-keySKILL.md:40AWS access key ID (placeholder value)accessKeyId: "AKIA…PLE",
placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:67Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)* **Privilege Escalation Flaws:** Look for code paths where a user can modify their own role or permissions in an API request (e.g., submitting a JSON payload with `"role": "admin"`).
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicSKILL.md:103Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)os.system(f"grep 'pattern' {filename}")security skill
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4541 tokens
- 100Steps. 46 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.