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BC regime-confluence

Multi-timeframe regime agreement score for higher-confidence entries

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kynto2001-ctrl v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 458 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 20 h ago

Multi-timeframe regime agreement score for higher-confidence entries

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureConfluenceSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The skill asks an agent to use a wallet private key for automatic paid signal calls. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Use only a dedicated wallet with minimal USDC and never provide a primary wallet private key. <br>

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 10 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 458 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 68: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This paid trading-signal skill is coherent, but it asks an agent to use a wallet private key for automatic per-call payments without enough consent or key-safety boundaries.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 27 Jun 2026