SKILLEMALL.ai

CF qfc-openclaw-skill

QFC blockchain interaction — wallet, faucet, chain queries, staking, epoch & finality, AI inference

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Larry Lai v3.4.0 MIT-0 44 files · 1 script body ≈ 5 156 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 39/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/demo-*.mjs

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
46
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
39/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/demo-*.mjs
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/wallet-operations.md:12
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `mnemonic`: `string` — 12-word BIP39 recovery phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/wallet-operations.md:80
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Decrypts the keystore file and returns a ready-to-use `QFCWallet` instance.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/wallet-operations.md:98
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Deletes the keystore file and metadata entry.
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:26
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Remove Wallet**: Delete a saved wallet's keystore file and metadata
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:285
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    Show me all token balances for address 0xfe…210
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:488
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    List all agents owned by 0xfe…210

Files scanned: 44. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5156 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/demo-*.mjs
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/demo-*.mjs
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/demo-*.mjs
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (qfc-openclaw-skill) differs from the folder (qfc)
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5156 tokens
  • 100Steps. 124 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 99: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -47 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -33 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 51 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 124 items
  • +4Has examples (72 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 46.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real QFC blockchain skill, but it can move assets, expose wallet secrets, and grant persistent permissions with insufficient built-in safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026