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DB chipchain

Semiconductor supply chain intelligence.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: lboquillon v1.0.9 MIT-0 35 files body ≈ 6 786 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
58
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use sources.md:45
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Ocp-Apim-Subscription-Key: $COMTRADE_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use sources.md:49
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Ocp-Apim-Subscription-Key: $COMTRADE_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sources.md:65
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -o corpCode.zip "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/corpCode.xml?crtfc_key=…"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use sources.md:65
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -o corpCode.zip "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/corpCode.xml?crtfc_key=…"
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use sources.md:68
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/list.json?crtfc_key=…&corp_code=…&bgn_de=…&end_de=…&page_count=10"
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use sources.md:71
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/fnlttSinglAcntAll.json?crtfc_key=…&corp_code=…&bsns_year=2023&reprt_code=11011&fs_div=CFS"
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sources.md:104
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s "http://plus.kipris.or.kr/openapi/rest/patUtiModInfoSearchSevice/applicantNameSearchInfo?applicant=삼성전자&numOfRows=10&pageNo=1&ServiceKey=…"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sources.md:107
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s "http://plus.kipris.or.kr/openapi/rest/patUtiModInfoSearchSevice/ipcSearchInfo?ipc=H01L&numOfRows=10&pageNo=1&ServiceKey=…"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sources.md:68
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/list.json?crtfc_key=…&corp_code=…&bgn_de=…&end_de=…&page_count=10"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url sources.md:71
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s "https://opendart.fss.or.kr/api/fnlttSinglAcntAll.json?crtfc_key=…&corp_code=…&bsns_year=2023&reprt_code=11011&fs_div=CFS"
    placeholder

Files scanned: 35. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6786 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6786 tokens
  • 100Steps. 92 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 21 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 40: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -34 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 92 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
ChipChain is a disclosed semiconductor supply-chain research skill with broad but purpose-matched web/API research behavior; its main caution is optional verification scripts that may install Python packages when run.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026