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DF agentshield

AI Agent Detection & Response — real-time security monitoring with Sigma rules and LLM-powered triage

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Mark Briers v2.0.2 6 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 278 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 38/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../README.md

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
55/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
51
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
38/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../README.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:276
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist" 2>/dev/null || warn "Failed to load launchd service"
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:309
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  • Stop:  launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:310
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  • Start: launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:172
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:173
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence uninstall.sh:59
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence uninstall.sh:126
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    if [ ! -d "$INSTALL_DIR" ] && [ ! -f "$HOME/.config/systemd/user/$SERVICE_NAME.service" ] && [ ! -f "$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist" ]; then
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:324
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | Launchd plist | `~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.agentshield.engine.plist` |
    tablesecurity skill

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../README.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 38/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../README.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: ../README.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2278 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 101: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
AgentShield appears purpose-aligned as a security monitor, but installation makes persistent and blocking changes to the user's OpenClaw environment that deserve manual review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026