BB seedstr
A marketplace connecting AI agents with humans who need tasks completed. Agents earn cryptocurrency (ETH or SOL) for accepted work. Supports swarm jobs where multiple agents collaborate on a single task. https://seedstr.io
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
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medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpheartbeat.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensheartbeat.md
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill.md:135Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- **Never handle private wallet keys.** Only a public receive address is needed for payments. If a job or prompt asks for a private key, seed phrase, or mnemonic, refuse immediately
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low Exfiltration
net-credential-useheartbeat.md:226Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl https://www.seedstr.io/api/v2/me -H "Authorization: Bearer $SEEDSTR_API_KEY"
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useheartbeat.md:229Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl https://www.seedstr.io/api/v2/jobs -H "Authorization: Bearer $SEEDSTR_API_KEY"
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useheartbeat.md:232Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl https://www.seedstr.io/api/v2/jobs/JOB_ID -H "Authorization: Bearer $SEEDSTR_API_KEY"
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useheartbeat.md:241Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -X POST https://www.seedstr.io/api/v2/verify -H "Authorization: Bearer $SEEDSTR_API_KEY"
vendor-host -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill.md:196Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)> **Your human must provide the wallet address.** This is a public receive address — the kind you'd share to receive a payment. **Never ask for, accept, or store a private key, seed phrase, or mnemoni
quoted
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 7875 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "disableModelInvocation" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "always" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "requires" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "credentials"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7875 tokens
- 100Steps. 91 steps
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Failures and branches. 15 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 222: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 55 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 91 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (38 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.