SKILLEMALL.ai

DC claw-apply

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Matthew Jackson v0.1.5 48 files body ≈ 2 297 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url lib/constants.mjs:69
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const TELEGRAM_API_BASE = 'https://api.telegram.org/bot';
    quoted

Files scanned: 48. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2297 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a coherent job-application automation tool, but it can automatically submit real applications and send sensitive profile data to external services with limited safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026