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CD agentic-loop-upgrade

Enhanced agentic loop with planning, parallel execution, confidence gates, semantic error recovery, and observable state machine. Includes Mode dashboard UI for easy configuration.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: maverick-software v2.4.1 MIT-0 80 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 799 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 42/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDiscordAI and agentsData and analyticsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
62/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
62
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
42/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/dist/execution/approval-gate.js:39
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (detector / deny-list definition)
    { pattern: /:(){ :|:& };:/i, level: "critical", reason: "Fork bomb" },
    detector
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/execution/approval-gate.ts:90
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (detector / deny-list definition)
    { pattern: /:(){ :|:& };:/i, level: "critical" as RiskLevel, reason: "Fork bomb" },
    detector
Medium and low: 2
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:3
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    [![Source](https://img.shields.io/badge/source-github.com%2Fopenclaw%2Fsk…lue)](https://github.com/openclaw/skill-agentic-loop-upgrade)
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SECURITY.md:19
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **Privilege escalation** | No |

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 42/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agentic-loop-upgrade) differs from the folder (agent-mode-upgrades)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4799 tokens
  • 100Steps. 58 steps
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -222 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -47 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 180: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 58 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it changes the agent loop in high-impact ways and its safety controls do not reliably require explicit approval before risky actions proceed.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026