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BD openclaw-vps-deploy

Deploy a custom OpenClaw repo (official or forked) to a Hostinger VPS and make it accessible via the cloud. Use when setting up a new OpenClaw instance on a remote VPS, deploying a custom or forked OpenClaw build to a server, making OpenClaw accessible at a public URL, or setting up OpenClaw as a cloud-hosted service on Hostinger. Handles SSH connection, Node.js install, OpenClaw install (npm package or git clone+build), systemd service, firewall, and auth token generation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: maverick-software v1.1.0 5 files body ≈ 1 244 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/multi-agent.md:170
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (documentation of a security skill)
      # Prints a random https://*.trycloudflare.com URL
      security skill
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files SKILL.md:51
      Reads credential / secret files (documentation of a security skill)
      cp /mnt/c/Users/charl/.ssh/id_ed25519 /tmp/vps_key
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/multi-agent.md:156
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable openclaw-alex
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/deploy.py:80
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
      run(client, "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>&1 | tail -3", timeout=60)
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/deploy.py:199
      Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
      run(client, "systemctl enable openclaw", timeout=10)
      code literal

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1244 tokens
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 478: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill appears to do what it claims, but it deploys a persistent, internet-reachable root service while handling API keys, SSH trust, and auth tokens in ways users should review carefully.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026