BD BrainX V5 — The First Brain for OpenClaw
Vector memory engine with PostgreSQL + pgvector + OpenAI embeddings. Stores, searches, and injects contextual memories into LLM prompts. Includes auto-injection hook for OpenClaw and full backup/recovery system.
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyREADME.md:793Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body; documentation table row)| `private_key_block` | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader onlytable -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:509Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)cp .env.example .env
security skill -
low Secrets in code
secret-aws-keyREADME.md:788AWS access key ID (placeholder value)| `aws_access_key` | `AKIA…PLE` |
placeholder
A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 34. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (BrainX V5 — The First Brain for OpenClaw) differs from the folder (brainx)
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4294 tokens
- 100Steps. 71 steps
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -248 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- -411 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 211: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 71 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.