SKILLEMALL.ai

BD codeline

Manage codeline via CLI - tools, products, orders, users, coupons. Use when user mentions 'codeline', 'products', 'orders', 'coupons', 'school platform', or wants to interact with the Codeline API.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Melvyn v0.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 742 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 37/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
37/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:18
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      bun --version || curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 37/100

    • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (codeline) differs from the folder (codeline-cli)
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 742 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3No numbered steps or checklist
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 197: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill appears to do what it claims, but it gives an agent broad authenticated access to Codeline business data and actions with weak scoping and risky setup guidance.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026