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BD clawpay

Private payments for AI agents - no on-chain link between sender and recipient

ClawHub Agent Skills author: mmchougule v0.1.0 2 files body ≈ 1 359 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:20
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Prerequisites:** You need a wallet private key with USDT on BSC.
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:36
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    const USDT = '0x55…955';
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:183
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | USDT | `0x55…955` |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:184
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | USDC | `0x8A…80d` |
    table

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawpay) differs from the folder (clawpay-2)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1359 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 78: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This payment skill is not deceptive, but it asks agents to handle wallet keys, reusable signatures, external API calls, and real token transfers without enough safeguards or warning.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026