SKILLEMALL.ai

BD 网站测试安全规则

通用网站安全测试(授权渗透测试)规则与检查清单。当用户要求对网站 / Web 应用做安全测试、漏洞扫描、渗透测试、安全评估,或提到安全测试规则、最小影响测试、隐蔽测试、漏洞复查、授权门禁时使用。核心强调:必须获得授权(默认开启授权门禁,主用非对称签名授权令牌验证 AUTHORIZATION.json + 公钥验签,其余为备选)、最小影响、测试后还原、规范报告、不破坏目标、禁止跳出授权范围(含外站关联尝试须授权,规则 23)。关键词:网站安全测试、授权渗透测试、安全规则、漏洞测试、安全评估、渗透测试规范、web 安全、最小影响、隐蔽测试、授权门禁、签名授权、授权验证、mowenfalse、mowenbrokentrue、mowenwaitrue、禁止越界、外站授权

ClawHub Agent Skills author: mowenQWQ v0.2.0 MIT-0 19 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 121 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

通用网站安全测试(授权渗透测试)规则与检查清单。当用户要求对网站 / Web 应用做安全测试、漏洞扫描、渗透测试、安全评估,或提到安全测试规则、最小影响测试、隐蔽测试、漏洞复查、授权门禁时使用。核心强调:必须获得授权(默认开启授权门禁,主用非对称签名授权令牌验证 AUTHORIZATION.json +…

As a process D 37/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
37/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:99
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    > ⚠️ 本 Skill 仅用于 **已获授权** 的安全测试(自有系统、CTF、Bug Bounty 等)。**未经授权对他人系统进行测试属于违法行为,请勿滥用,使用者须自行承担全部法律责任。**

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "created"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "updated"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "lang"

Process rating: all ten parameters 37/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (网站测试安全规则) differs from the folder (web-security-test-rules)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4121 tokens
  • 100Steps. 163 steps
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 335: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 55 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 163 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a mostly coherent authorized web-security-testing skill, but it includes local override switches that can weaken authorization and destructive-action safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 1 Sept 2026