SKILLEMALL.ai

BC aimine

Mine AIT (Proof of AI Work) on BNB Chain. Install, configure, start/stop mining entirely from OpenClaw. No terminal or manual file edits required.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: nancyuahon v1.0.2 2 files body ≈ 1 027 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:44
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    The user must have provided wallet private key and OpenAI API key (either in OpenClaw skill config as PRIVATE_KEY and OPENAI_KEY or OPENAI_API_KEY, or in the conversation). If users get "invalid API k

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
  • 85Steps. 17 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1027 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 146: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a coherent AIT mining purpose, but it asks the agent to run unpinned third-party code with wallet and API credentials, including credentials pasted in chat.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026