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BD openclaw-memoria

Local-first, multi-agent persistent memory for AI assistants. Use it to install, operate, connect, diagnose, or update Memoria on macOS.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: @Nitix_ v3.35.0 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 568 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host docs/v3/INSTALLATION-RESEAU.md:11
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Primo-Studio/openclaw-memoria/memoria-v1/scripts/install-memoria.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:14
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Primo-Studio/openclaw-memoria/memoria-v1/scripts/install-memoria.sh | sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:26
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Primo-Studio/openclaw-memoria/memoria-v1/scripts/install-memoria.sh | sh
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use docs/v3/port-map.json:1625
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "description": "Résolution de clé API d'override par-couche fausse : `apiKey: ov.apiKey || cfg.llm.apiKey || process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY || \"\"` → un override anthropic/openrouter sans clé propre héri
      quoted

    Files scanned: 26. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 9 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 568 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 136: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill mostly matches a local memory tool, but it installs a persistent daemon and automatic conversation-capture hooks through a broad unpinned installer, so it should be reviewed carefully before use.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 20 Jul 2026