SKILLEMALL.ai

BB hplan

Hierarchical persistent planning for complex multi-phase tasks. Use when the user asks to plan, break down, or execute a task involving multiple steps, deliverables, or coordinated work streams. Creates a .plan/ directory with overview.md (global summary) and per-phase directories (specs, checklists). Integrates with OpenClaw's memory system for cross-session continuity. Trigger phrases: plan, break down task, create plan, phased plan, multi-step task, start planning.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Noire v1.1.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 2 363 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:91
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    - **Exists with all phases complete**: Silently delete the entire `.plan/` directory and proceed normally.

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 63 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2363 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 472: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 63 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a legitimate planning skill, but it persists task details and can silently delete its plan directory without clear user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026