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BF clawdgo

ClawdGo Lobster Cybersecurity Camp. Train one lobster through 3 layers / 12 dimensions with modes W + A-H. Keep onboarding clear, mode boundaries strict, and outputs explainable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: NRT2024 v1.3.2 MIT-0 36 files body ≈ 6 019 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 44/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/scenarios/*.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
44/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/scenarios/*.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/scenarios/S4-02.md:37
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: EmailPass#2025
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:477
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Scenario source must be `references/scenarios/*.md`; no invented offensive-pentest topics.
    detector

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 36. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6019 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/scenarios/*.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/scenarios/*.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/scenarios/*.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6019 tokens
  • 100Steps. 276 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 15 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 178: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 276 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This security-training skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs review because it can write persistent memory/profile files and set up a real scheduled training job with broad triggers and limited upfront consent.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026