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BC github-backup

Automate OpenClaw workspace backups and skill version control to the private GitHub repo `nz365guy/openclaw-backup`. Use this when staging/committing workspace changes, rotating the PAT, or running the backup script to push updates.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Mark Smith v1.0.0 6 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 695 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmentWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/heartbeat.sh:84
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/watchdog.sh:32
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv references/repo-setup.md:12
      Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)
      - Rotate the token by updating `.env.local`, then run `source .env.local` (or restart the shell) before the next push.
      detector
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv references/repo-setup.md:22
      Reads a .env file
      source .env.local
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/repo-setup.md:23
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: token ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" https://api.github.com/user | jq '.login'
      known service
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/heartbeat.sh:84
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/watchdog.sh:32
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:12
      Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)
      1. **Auth loaded** – `source .env.local` to expose `GITHUB_TOKEN` (repo+workflow scopes). Never commit `.env.local`.
      detector
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:34
      Reads a .env file
      source .env.local

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 16 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 695 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -33 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 232: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The backup skill contains extra monitoring scripts that can send local system status and an SSH address to a hardcoded Telegram chat, which is not disclosed by the skill’s stated backup purpose.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 28 May 2026