FD apiosk
(no description)
As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellREADME.md:58Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash
Medium and low: 7
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellcheck-balance.sh:28Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)echo "⚠️ Install Foundry to check on-chain balance: curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash"
code literal -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSECURITY.md:51Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash
security skill -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellsetup-wallet.sh:29Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)echo " curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash"
code literal -
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill-card.md:20Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetRisk: The skill handles real crypto funds and stores the generated wallet private key in plaintext on disk. <br>
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokensetup-wallet.sh:58High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"usdc_contract": "0x83…913",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:304High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"usdc_contract": "0x83…913"
quoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:322Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)./configure.sh --alert-balance 1.00 --alert-webhook "https://hooks.slack.com/..."
placeholder
Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2556 tokens
- low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -228 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 38 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (25 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.