SKILLEMALL.ai

AC background-removal

Remove backgrounds from images with BiRefNet via inference.sh CLI. Model: BiRefNet (high accuracy background removal). Use for: product photos, portraits, e-commerce, transparent PNGs, photo editing. Triggers: remove background, background removal, remove bg, transparent background, cut out image, background remover, rembg, product photo editing, cutout, transparent png, bg removal, photo cutout

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ömer Karışman v0.1.5 2 files body ≈ 592 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationWriting and documentsMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:16
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 592 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 398: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly about image background removal, but it tells users to run mutable remote installers and optional unpinned skill installs that expand trust beyond the stated task.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026