SKILLEMALL.ai

BF auto-collaboration-dev-pipeline

Fully automated collaborative code development pipeline for complex code development tasks. Must be used when users request code development, program writing, feature implementation, or have code quality requirements.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: OpenLark v1.0.1 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 1 969 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 48/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/<role>.md

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
48/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/<role>.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Obfuscation
If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Obfuscation uni-zero-width references/documentation-engineer.md:56
    Zero-width / invisible characters (possible hidden text) (4 occurrences)
    ␀```markdown

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/<role>.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/<role>.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/<role>.md
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 100Steps. 55 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1969 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 217: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed instruction-only coding workflow that can create project files automatically, but I found no hidden execution, credential access, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026