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CD immortal-brain

Agent AI Autonom Proactiv v5.0 pentru OpenClaw. Workflow automat cu cercetare, analiză, planificare și execuție. Feedback loop cu timeout 6 minute, conexiuni între task-uri și învățare continuă. Frecvență 2 minute cu raportare procentuală.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ovidiuproca v5.0.0 20 files body ≈ 4 755 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 42/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
42/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence INSTALL.md:220
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    schtasks /create /tn "ImmortalBrainHeartbeat" /tr "python D:\OpenClaw_Setup\skills\immortal-brain\scripts\brain_service.py heartbeat" /sc minute /mo 2
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/brain_agent.py:453
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"
    quoted

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 42/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (immortal-brain) differs from the folder (imortalbrain)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4755 tokens
  • 100Steps. 86 steps
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -266 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 239: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 86 items
  • +4Has examples (35 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill needs review because it creates an autonomous background task and memory system that can proceed after silence, persist user/profile data, and optionally send workspace-derived content to Telegram.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026