CD bitagent-skill
Launch, buy, and sell tokens on BitAgent bonding curves via CLI. Use when the user wants to create a new agent token, or trade existing agent tokens on BitAgent (BSC Testnet/Mainnet).
As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsREADME.md:61Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target| `PRIVATE_KEY` | Wallet private key (0x...) for the agent wallet. |
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/index.ts:175Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)const res = await fetch(`${config.apiBase}/agent?token=${tokenAddress}`); -
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/index.ts:183Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)const resList = await fetch(`${config.apiBase}/agents?token=${tokenAddress}`); -
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/index.ts:196Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)const resDetail = await fetch(`${config.apiBase}/agents/${tokenAddress}`); -
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsskill-card.md:24Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer targetRisk: A raw wallet private key can authorize token launches and trades.
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:14Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `PRIVATE_KEY` — Wallet private key (0x...)
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/index.ts:31High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)token: '0x7e…B37',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/index.ts:38High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)token: '0xB9…085',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/index.ts:45High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)token: '0xae…7cd',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/index.ts:55High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)token: '0x40…Fde',
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/index.ts:62High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)token: '0x8d…B0d',
quoted
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (bitagent-skill) differs from the folder (openclaw-bitagent)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 5 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 568 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 183: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.