SKILLEMALL.ai

BC github-webhook-architect

Guides users through configuring OpenClaw, Nginx, and GitHub Actions to establish a secure, autonomous GitHub integration pipeline.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Patrik Ekenberg v1.1.2 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 399 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Concealment medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:67
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (documentation of a security skill)
    # Accept traffic at /agent and silently forward it to OpenClaw's /hooks/agent
    security skill

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2399 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 131: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not malware, but it should be reviewed because it can set up GitHub events that trigger an agent to act with broad GitHub authority.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026