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BD wechat-auto-reply-toolkit

Windows 本地微信自动回复与消息处理工具。用于 Codex 需要在已登录的 PC 微信上执行联系人定位、OCR 读取最新消息、生成并发送中文回复、发送图片/视频/文件、截图最新图片预览、或启动常驻守护进程加速代回时。适用于“回 xxx”“查看微信最新消息”“帮我发图片/视频”“把微信代回流程固化成快路径”等场景。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: PDDsa v1.0.0 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 685 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/wechat_send.py:736
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (wechat-auto-reply-toolkit) differs from the folder (wechat-reply-ai)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 685 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 160: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill does what it claims broadly, but it gives an agent powerful control over private WeChat conversations with under-disclosed auto-reply, background, screenshot, and remote LLM behaviors.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026