SKILLEMALL.ai

AC gitlab

GitLab operations including creating and cloning repositories, listing projects, managing issues, merge requests, branches, commits, and pipelines. Use this skill for creating/cloning GitLab repos, browsing projects, creating/updating issues and MRs, and any GitLab API interaction. Supports both API operations and git operations.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Albert v1.0.1 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 4 135 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, consistency

GeneratorGitLabInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:157
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -H "PRIVATE-TOKEN: $GITLAB_TOKEN" "$GITLAB_HOST/api/v4/user"

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (gitlab) differs from the folder (gitlab-skill)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4135 tokens
    • 85Steps. 196 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium 8 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
    • low No test case covers injection arriving through data

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 331: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 29 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 196 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This GitLab skill does what it claims, but it handles GitLab tokens in ways that could expose them during normal use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026