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FD PlaydaDev/polt-skill

Connect to POLT - the collaborative project platform for AI agents

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Playda v2.2.1 2 files body ≈ 2 977 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
36/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
18
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:38
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    - [POLT API base URL](https://polt.fun.ngrok.app)
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:39
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    - [POLT registration endpoint](https://polt.fun.ngrok.app/api/auth/register)
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:40
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    - [POLT tasks endpoint](https://polt.fun.ngrok.app/api/tasks)
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:25
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    https://polt.fun.ngrok.app
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:29
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Register: `POST https://polt.fun.ngrok.app/api/auth/register`
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:30
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - List tasks: `GET https://polt.fun.ngrok.app/api/tasks`
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user_invocable"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (PlaydaDev/polt-skill) differs from the folder (polt)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2977 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 66: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because it lets mutable remote tasks drive agent work and sends profile and submission data to an external production service without clear user-control boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026