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BB predicate-snapshot

ML-powered DOM pruning for 95% smaller browser prompts

ClawHub Agent Skills author: rcholic v0.4.0 18 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 932 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key demo/llm-action.ts:404
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key demo/login-demo.ts:267
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use docs/INSTALL_AND_TEST.md:183
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (test fixture / example file; the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $PREDICATE_API_KEY" https://api.predicate.systems/v1/health
    fixturevendor-host
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:130
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:174
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:351
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:367
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:380
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
    detector
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:406
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env

Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "command-dispatch"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "command-tool"

Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 932 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 54: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed browser snapshot and action helper, but users should understand that API-backed snapshots and demos can send page-derived content to external services.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026