SKILLEMALL.ai
RU Sign in

BC markdown-to-image

Use when user wants to convert Markdown content into shareable image cards — triggered by phrases like "转图片"、"做卡片"、"生成海报"、"生成分享图"、"把这个转成图片"、"export as image". Applies to any .md file or inline Markdown content destined for WeChat, Xiaohongshu, Weibo, or similar platforms.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ruifu Wu v1.0.0 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 457 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user skill-card.md:20
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Risk: The renderer can silently delete the selected output folder. <br>
Medium and low: 7
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:167
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…UNf+pIrK…WvF/eTpJ…KEx/+gpHb…3ww==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:205
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…e0W+D5lrFiAEYR+pb6w…SEv+dT4M…otw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:284
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…g6R+AzUH…NSO/qmHP…5aA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:299
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…tDA+xiEdPZQwy/trcQ…MZX/e09F4g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:329
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…EHs/BwLgxc+MKi1…wI5+b7RmfWlg==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/generator.js:40
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/generator.js:184
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 457 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 272: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real Markdown-to-image skill, but it needs review because it can silently delete the chosen output folder and can make outbound network requests while rendering Markdown.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026