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AC wecom-openclaw

Integrate WeChat Work (Enterprise WeChat) with OpenClaw for intelligent messaging. Enables receiving messages from WeChat Work, processing them with Claude AI, and sending async replies. Handles msg_signature verification, AES-256-CBC encryption/decryption, and secure token-based authentication. Use when setting up bidirectional WeChat Work ↔ OpenClaw communication.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: richagain v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 187 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/setup-guide.md:20
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      2. **URL**: Your public endpoint (e.g., `https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com/webhook`)
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/index.js:192
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      `https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…
      placeholder

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 15 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1187 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 368: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 2 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This looks like a real WeCom-to-OpenClaw messaging bridge, but it handles business chat contents and secrets with too little scoping and disclosure.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026