SKILLEMALL.ai

DF safeproactive

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: rigeneproject v1.0.3 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 496 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process F 31/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
56/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
31/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (2) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md, SOUL.md
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SOUL.md:206
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Attack 4: Privilege Escalation (Resource Boundary Break)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SOUL.md:216
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **You cannot:** Bypass OS-level security. You cannot attempt privilege escalation.

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 31/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 496 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 0 headings, hard to scan
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
SafeProactive is a disclosed safety and audit-log framework, with broad activation and local log retention that users should configure carefully.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026