BC contract-diff
Compare contract templates with scanned stamped contracts, list all differences (additions, deletions, modifications). Output as Word document for easy download. Use when user wants to verify what changes were made between a template and the final signed contract.
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.
Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Concealment
en-hide-from-userskill-card.md:20Instruction to hide actions from the userRisk: The skill can silently install Python packages during execution. <br>
Medium and low: 1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicscripts/compare.py:22Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted inputos.system(f'pip install {pkg} -q')
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Steps. 28 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 785 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 264: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.