SKILLEMALL.ai

AA orb

Create and share rich interactive artifacts (webpages, markdown, flowcharts) as hosted links from any AI conversation. Use when the user asks to create a dashboard, report, chart, visualization, interactive page, or any shareable content. Triggers on: "create an artifact", "make this shareable", "make this interactive", "create a webpage/dashboard/chart/document".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Sai Bhaskar Devatha v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 509 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

As a process A 80/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

GeneratorData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
80/100
Runs to the end
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Inputs and preconditions w 11
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(curl:*)

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 80/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1509 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 366: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill does what it claims by publishing artifacts to Orb, but it needs review because it tells agents to persist an API key in local config or shell files and uses broad triggers that can send content to an external service.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026