BC system-integrity-and-backup
Encrypted backups, integrity verification, and data retention enforcement for Greek legal requirements (5-20 year retention). AES-256.
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenEVALS.json:34High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"Names the file following convention: snap…89_{date}.tar.enc",quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5179 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5179 tokens
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- medium 5 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
- low No test case covers injection arriving through data
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 134: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
The skill has a legitimate backup and integrity purpose, but its own documentation conflicts on encryption-key storage and describes broad backup, decryption, retention, and cleanup actions without clear enough operator controls.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026