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AD scaffold-lite

Your agent. Configured to you. Remembers everything. Includes setup wizard, 30-day roadmap, 25 ready-to-use prompts, and pre-built memory files.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: getscaffold v1.0.1 MIT-0 19 files · 1 script body ≈ 332 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

TemplateAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump IDENTITY.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (6) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      IDENTITY.md, memory/active-tasks.md, memory/lessons.md, MEMORY.md, SOUL.md

    Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (scaffold-lite) differs from the folder (scaffold)
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 332 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 144: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 4 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This looks like a real agent setup package, but it gives the agent broad ongoing authority over files, memory, commits, and possible external pushes that users should review first.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026