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DD beacon

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: AutoJanitor v2.16.1 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 798 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationGitHubAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
42/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 14

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 14
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:42
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # With mnemonic seed phrase support
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:114
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Generate with BIP39 mnemonic (24-word seed phrase)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:120
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Restore from seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:784
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Use `beacon identity new --password` to encrypt your keystore with a password. For additional security, use `beacon identity new --mnemonic` to generate a BIP39 seed phrase backup.
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token atlas/advertise.js:102
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    <br>wRTC on Solana: <span style="color:#fff">12TA…i4X</span>
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process atlas/DEPLOY_FIX_2127.md:19
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable beacon_atlas
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token atlas/DEPLOY_FIX_2127.md:57
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    **Wallet**: RTCb…72b
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets beacon_skill/cli.py:4627
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    sp.add_argument("--mnemonic", action="store_true", help="Derive from a BIP39 24-word seed phrase")
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets beacon_skill/cli.py:4635
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    sp = ident_sub.add_parser("restore", help="Restore identity from a mnemonic seed phrase")
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets beacon_skill/cli.py:4890
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    sp.add_argument("--mnemonic", action="store_true", help="Generate with a 24-word seed phrase")
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token beacon_skill/transports/conway.py:28
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ERC8…TRY = "0x80…432"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token beacon_skill/transports/conway.py:29
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ERC8…ION = "0x80…b63"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token beacon_skill/transports/conway.py:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    USDC_BASE = "0x83…913"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:529
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | [Red Team the Protocol](https://github.com/Scottcjn/rustchain-bounties/issues/377) | TBD | Falsify Beacon invariants |

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 20 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 798 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its advertised agent-messaging and payment purpose, but it combines high-impact account, wallet, identity, and public-registration powers with security overclaims and weak defaults that need review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 8 Jun 2026