SKILLEMALL.ai

BB alibabacloud-ack-cli

Use when the user operates Alibaba Cloud Container Service for Kubernetes (ACK). Covers cluster lifecycle (create / modify / delete / upgrade), node pools & nodes (create, modify, delete, repair, fix CVE), addons (install / upgrade / uninstall), KubeConfig & RBAC (issue for RAM user, grant / revoke), security & policy (CVE scan/fix, policy governance, KMS, delete protection), logging / audit / alerting, intelligent O&M (check / inspect / diagnosis / auto-repair), async tasks (track / pause / resume / cancel), templates, autoscaling, tags & quotas. Triggers: create / upgrade / delete ACK cluster, migrate to Pro, scale nodepool, fix node CVE, install / remove addon, get / revoke kubeconfig, grant RBAC, enable audit log, run inspection, diagnose cluster, track task_id, debug cs error, Forbidden.RAM, kubectl cannot connect. Terms: ACK, container service, k8s cluster, nodepool, addon, AutoMode, Terway, Flannel, ForRegion, kubeconfig, RBAC, CVE.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.2 MIT-0 10 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 5 855 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 12 h ago

Covers cluster lifecycle (create / modify / delete / upgrade), node pools & nodes (create, modify, delete, repair, fix CVE), addons (install / upgrade /…

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

IntegrationKubernetesSecurityInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
50
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-plugin-installation-guide.md:52
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-plugin-installation-guide.md:56
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5855 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 4, 10, 65, 67, 91, 211): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5855 tokens
  • 85Steps. 25 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 953: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real ACK administration helper, but it recommends very broad cloud permissions and handles cluster access files without enough safety guidance, so it should be reviewed before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 14 Aug 2026