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BB alibabacloud-elasticsearch-instance-manage

Alibaba Cloud Elasticsearch Instance & Config Management Skill. Use for managing the lifecycle of an Elasticsearch instance (create, query, list, restart, upgrade/downgrade, node info) and for managing instance-side config such as snapshot backup and analyzer dictionaries. Triggers: "elasticsearch", "ES instance", "elasticsearch instance", "create ES", "query ES instance", "restart ES", "ES node", "cluster node", "upgrade ES", "downgrade ES", "scale ES", "resize ES", "ES snapshot", "ES backup", "snapshot setting", "create snapshot", "ES dict", "IK dict", "hot dict", "synonyms dict", "aliws dict", "analyzer dictionary"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.5 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 3 768 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:56
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:71
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:84
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:97
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:81
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      > run `curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash` to update,
      quoted

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 6 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3768 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 22 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 625: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not malicious, but it gives an agent broad control over Alibaba Cloud Elasticsearch operations that can affect availability, billing, credentials, and installed plugins.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 13 Jul 2026