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BD sentinel-shield

Runtime security for OpenClaw agents. Monitors tool calls, enforces rate limits, scans for prompt injection, and alerts on suspicious behavior. Protect your gateway token and agent session from infostealers and session hijacking.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: shadowfax-mitch v0.2.0 9 files body ≈ 967 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url INSTALL.md:35
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. Visit: `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates`
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/injectionScanner.js:15
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    { id: 'SUDO_ESCAPE', re: /sudo |chmod 777|chown root|escalat/i, severity: 'high' },
    security skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:113
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. Message your bot to get your chat ID: `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates`
    placeholder
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:147
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - `/etc/sudoers` — Privilege escalation paths

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 967 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -33 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 229: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Sentinel Shield appears to be a legitimate security helper, but it needs review because it reads sensitive host files by default and overstates some active protection features.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026